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Proposed Revisions to the

Georgia Uniform Commercial
Code: A Status Report
by Albert H. Conrad, Jr.*
and
Richard P. Kessler, Jr.**
The Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code" or "U.C.C."), as promulgated in the 1950s through the joint efforts of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the "NCCUSL") and the American Law Institute (the "A.L.I."), represented an attempt to integrate all
facets of commercial transactions involving personal property in a comprehensive law that could be adopted by all the states.' The drafters of
the Code did not envision, however, that multistate uniformity, once
achieved by the Code, would remain fixed and inflexible. Changes in business practices and technology, developments in related areas of the law
(both national and international), and the need for correction and clarification of the law as demonstrated by practical experience and judicial
decisions, were recognized as inevitable forces for periodic revision of the
Code.
Since the Code's enactment in virtually all states in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, there have been a number of major revisions to the Official
Text of the U.C.C. ("Official Text"). Georgia adopted many, although not
Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Tennessee
(B.S., 1972); University of Virginia (J.D., 1975). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Corporate
and Banking Law Section (Vice Chair 1991-92); Uniform Commercial Code Committee
(Chair 1988-90)).
** Partner in the firm of Macey, Wilensky, Cohen, Wittner & Kessler, Atlanta, Georgia.
Fairfield University (B.A., 1968); Emory University (J.D., 1971). Member, State Bar of
Georgia (Chair, Uniform Commercial Code Committee, Corporate and Banking Law Section
(1991-92)). The author participated in the drafting of the NCCUSL official versions of revised Article 3 and the amendments to Article 4 as well as Article 4A.
1. See Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), General Comment of National Conference
(1987).
of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws and The American Law Institute
*
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all, of the miscellaneous amendments to the Official Text recommended
by the Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") in 19622 and 1966,3 as well as
the comprehensive revision of Article 9-Secured Transactions recommended in 1972." However, Georgia has not enacted any of the other revisions approved by the PEB since 1972: the 1977 revision of Article 8-Investment Securities to accommodate certificateless securities, the 1987
adoption of new Article 2A-Leases to govern personal property leasing
transactions, the 1988 recommendation to repeal Article 6-Bulk Transfers or, alternatively, to revise Article 6 substantially, the 1989 adoption
of new Article 4A-Funds Transfers to govern wire transfers, and the
1990 revision of Article 3-Commercial Paper (with conforming amendments to Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collections) to modernize those
payment statutes.
The Georgia Uniform Commercial Code Committee (the "Georgia
U.C.C. Committee") of the Georgia State Bar's Corporate and Banking
Law Section has been considering these various revisions to the Code for
possible adoption in Georgia. In the case of new Article 4A. and revised
Article 8, the Committee participated in the drafting of the legislation
that was enacted in the 1992 Session of the Georgia General Assembly to
incorporate these revisions in Georgia's Code.6 The following is a report
on the Georgia U.C.C. Committee's efforts.
I.

ARTICLE 2A-LEASES

A. Background
Despite the Code's comprehensive treatment of commercial transactions, leases of personal property were not covered in the early versions of
the Code, presumably*due to the relatively low incidence of leasing activity during that period.' However, propelled by favorable tax laws, bank
regulatory changes and accounting conventions, as well as an increase in
capital investment generally, the personal property leasing business ex2. 1963 Ga. Laws 188.
3. 1973 Ga. Laws 437; 1978 Ga. Laws 1081, 1138. Georgia did not adopt the 1966 Amendments to the following Code sections: UC.C. §§ 2-318, 2-702(3), and 3-501(3).
4. 1978 Ga. Laws 1081 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 11-9-101 to -507 (1982 & Supp. 1991)).
5. On May 4, 1992, Zell Miller, Governor of Georgia, signed House Bills 762 and 761
adopting Article 4A and revised Article 8 with only minor variations from the Official Texts
as the law in Georgia (to be codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 11-8-101 to -408 (1982) and
O.C.G.A. §§ 11-4A-101 to -507 (1992)). The sections appearing in House Bills 762 and 761 as
adopted are the same sections appearing in the O.C.G.A. [hereinafter respectively Article 4A
and revised Article 8].
6. See 1A J. WIrTE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2 (3d ed. 1988); Amelia
H. Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitionersand Scholars Alike, 39 ALA,
L. REv. 575, 576 (1988).
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perienced enormous growth from the 1950s to the 1980s.' But while leasing played an increasingly important role in modern commercial transactions, the lease relationship itself continued to be governed largely by
centuries old common law principles of bailments and contracts, occasional analogies to real estate lease law and Article 2 of the Code, and a
handful of provisions of Article 9 of the Code.'
By 1981, both the NCCUSL and the American Bar Association's Uniform Commercial Code Committee, through its newly formed Subcommittee on Personal Property Leasing, were actively considering adoption
of a uniform statute to govern personal property leasing.' The NCCUSL
approved a new "freestanding" Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act
in 1985, but elected not to encourage adoption by the states until the Act
could be incorporated as a new article of the Code.10 In 1987 the NCCUSL and A.L.I. approved the Official Text of Article 2A-Leases.1"
B. Overview of Article 2A
The drafters of the 1987 Official Text of Article 2A had used Article
1
2-Sales as the statutory model for governing personal property leases. 2
Article 2A consists of five basic parts:
Part 1 (General Provisions) includes definitions of key terms (such as
"finance lease" and "consumer lease") and provisions dealing with such
matters as the relationship between Article 2A and other laws affecting
leasing, limitations on the selection of governing law and judicial forums
in consumer leases, and the doctrine of unconscionability.
Part 2 (Formationand Construction of Lease Contract) covers such
areas as express and implied warranties in leases (including special rules
for "finance leases") and application of the principles of the statute of
7. See Edwin E. Huddleson, III, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A-Leases, 39
ALA. L. REv. 615, 616 (1988); 3 J. Equipment Lease Financing 48, 51-61 (1985). During 1986,
the year preceding the adoption of Article 2A by the NCCUSL and A.L.I., it was estimated
that over $310 billion in lease receivables were outstanding, and that equipment valued in
excess of $90 billion was the subject of lease financing in the United States in 1986 alone. Id.
n.1.
8. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 2.
9. See Boss, supra note 6, at 585-88. The Georgia Bar was well represented on the
Subcommittee on Personal Property Leasing, whose membership included Robert D.
Strauss, Frank B. Wilensky, and Gerald T. Woods, all of the Georgia Bar.
10. See U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1987) (amended 1990), reprinted in 1B U.L.A. 654-55
(1989).
11. See U.C.C., Foreword to 1987 Official Text and Comments (1987) (amended 1990),
reprinted in 115 U.L.A. 648-49 (1989). The historical development of Article 2A is traced in
detail in Boss, supra note 6, at 584-96.
12. See U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1987) (amended 1990). For an excellent discussion of the
drafting process for Article 2A, see Boss, supra note 6, at 599-606.
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frauds, parol evidence, offer and acceptance, and allocation of risk of loss,
all in the context of personal property leases..
Part 3 (Effect of Lease Contract) includes provisions relating to the
filing of financing statements, enforceability of leases, alienability of
rights under leases, and competing rights and claims of third parties.
Part 4 (Performance of Lease Contract:Repudiated, Substituted and
Excused) contains provisions relating to adequate assurance of performance, anticipatory repudiation, and substituted and executed performance, as well as an automatic "hell or high water" obligation for payment
of rent under "finance leases."
Part 5 (Default) specifies statutory remedies for both lessor and lessee
upon default, including provisions for the appropriate measure of
damages."
Article 2A is accompanied by an amendment to the definition of the
term "security interest" contained in Article 1 of the Code.1 The amendment is designed to bring greater certainty to the distinction between
true leases, governed by Article 2A, and leases intended as security that
are subject to Article 9.15
C. 1990 Amendments
One of the first states to enact Article 2A was California. The Uniform
Commercial Code Committee of the California Bar's Business Law Section issued a detailed report on Article 2A in December 1987 and recommended that it be adopted only with a number of amendments to the
1987 Official Text. The California amendments included significant
changes in three areas of Article 2A: (1) expansion of transactions qualifying as "finance leases" for purposes of Article 2A; (2) restrictions
against contractual limitations on security assignments of the lessor's interest under a lease, and (3) distinctions between certain types of default
and related remedies and computation of damages."6 Other states, nota13. U.C.C. Art. 2A (1987) (amended 1990). A more detailed analysis of the key provisions of Article 2A appears in Robert D. Strauss, Equipment Leases Under U.C.C. Article
2A-Analysis and PracticeSuggestions, 43 MERCER L. REV. 853 (1992); see also Huddleson,
supra note 7, and the other articles comprising the Symposium: Article 2A of the Uniform
Commercial Code appearing in 39 ALA. L. REV. at 559-1049 (1988); Gregory J. Naples, A

Review and Analysis of the New Article 2A-Leases Amendment to the UCC and Its Impact on Secured Creditors, Equipment and FinanceLessors, 93 CoM. L.J. 342 (1988); Lawrence F. Flick, If, Article 2A-Leases, 44 Bus. LAW. 1501 (1989); and Ronald M. Bayer,
Personal Property Leasing: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 Bus. LAW. 1491

(1988).
14. U.C.C.
15. U.C.C.
16.

§ 1-201(37) (1990); O.C.G.A. § 11-1-201(37) (1991).
§ 1-201(37).

See REPORT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE OF THE BUSINESS LAW

SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA ON PROPOSED CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL CODE DIvI-
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bly New York and Massachusetts, also began considering various amendments to the 1987 Official Text, many of which tracked the California
amendments.
In response to this trend away from uniformity, albeit limited and by
no means fundamental, the NCCUSL and A.L.I. revised Article 2A to incorporate the principal amendments that originated in California."7 The
1990 Official Text has now replaced the 1987 version, and three of the
states that had previously adopted the 1987 Official Text have already
made conforming amendments to convert to the 1990 Official Text s As
of November 1991, a total of twenty-four states had enacted Article 2A."9
D. Status in Georgia
The Leasing Subcommittee of the Georgia U.C.C. Committee 0 has followed the development of Article 2A, particularly the recent resolution of
the differences between the 1987 Official Text and the California amendments. With the promulgation of the 1990 Official Text, the Leasing Subcommittee anticipates completion of its analysis of Article 2A and the
drafting of proposed legislation for approval by the Board of Governors of
the Georgia State Bar during 1992. If approved, the Leasing Subcommittee expects that a bill to enact Article 2A would be introduced in the 1993
Georgia General Assembly.
II.

ARTICLE 3-COMMERCIAL PAPER (WITH CONFORMING AMENDMENTS
TO ARTICLE 4)

A. Background
The predecessor of Article 3, the Negotiable Instruments Law
("N.I.L.") of 1896, was the first uniform state law promulgated by the
SION 10 (ARTICLE 2A) (Dec. 1, 1987), reprinted in 39 ALA. L. REV. 979 (1988). An excellent

discussion of the differences between the 1987 Official Text and the 1990 Amendments is
contained in Robert D. Strauss & Lawrence F. Flick, II, Leases, 46 Bus. LAW. 1509 (1991).

17.

See Foreword to U.C.C. Article 2A (1990), reprinted in Code Index U.C.C. Rep.

Serv. (Callaghan) 3-5 (1991).

18. The three states are Minnesota, Nevada, and Oklahoma. See U.C.C. Rep. Serv.,
State Correlation Tables (Callaghan) and by the NCCUSL in November 1991.
i9. The 19 states generally following the 1990 Official Text are California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming;

the three states generally following the 1987 Official Text are Florida, Oregon, and Utah;
South Dakota partially follows both versions (as reported by the American Law Institute).

20. Chaired by Robert D. Strauss of Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Atlanta, Georgia.
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NCCUSL.2 ' The N.I.L. itself was largely drawn from the codification of.
English common law of "bills and notes" set forth -in the British Bills of
Exchange Act.22 Although there was some effort made to modernize Arti-

cle 3 when the Code was initially drafted, much of its approach and sub-

23
stance still reflected eighteenth and nineteenth century common law.

The sweeping changes in technology and finance since the early 1950s
made Articles 3 and 4 prime candidates for revision. One major effort in
the late 1970s and early 1980s Was the A.L.I.'s wide ranging "Payments
Code" project. Although the project was not successful in all areas, it did
inspire the NCCUSL and A.L.I. to begin a separate effort to revise Article
3, which was completed in 1990.
B. Summary of Revisions to Article 3
'An in-depth discussion of revised Article 3 and the amendments to Article 4 is beyond the scope of this article. A review, however, of some of
the more significant sections of revised Article 3 and the amendments to
Article 4 is in order. The revised Article 3 drops the title "Commercial
Paper" and returns to "Negotiable Instruments," reflecting its N.I.L. origin and avoiding confusion with the modern usage of the term commercial paper in the context of the short term debt frequently issued by major corporations for operating funds.
In revised Article 3, the number of parts into which it is divided are
reduced from eight to six. Part seven in existing Article 3 is eliminated,
and part eight is eliminated in part and incorporated into other parts of
2
revised Article 3. 4
Under revised Article 3, a negotiable instrument is either a "draft" or a
"note. '21 Money, payment orders governed by Article 4A, and securities
governed by Article 8 are expressly excluded from revised Article 3.21
The scope of existing Article 3 is partially narrowed in revised Article 3.
The question of what is a negotiable instrument is answered by covering,
in theory, fewer instruments. Existing Article 3 applies to instruments
that have certain characteristics of negotiable instruments, except that
they are not made out "to order or bearer." ' Under existing Article 3,
21. See Robert G. Ballen et al., Commercial Paper,Bank Deposits and Collections, and
Other Payment Systems, 44 Bus. LAW. 1515, 1539 (1989).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. U.C.C. Art. 3 (1990) Correlation Table, reprintedin 2 U.L.A. 16 (1991).

25. U.C.C. § 3-104(e) (1990).
26. Id. § 3-102(a).
27. U.C.C. § 3-805 (1962). (The 1990 revision to U.C.C. Article 3 omitted this section.)

STATUS REPORT

1992]

such instruments are covered, but no holder of such instruments can be a
"holder in due course."'
This treatment of these hybrid negotiable instruments has created ambiguity in existing Article 3. In revised Article 3, the ambiguity is removed. The only instrument to which Article 3 would apply that is not a
bearer or order instrument is a check-:-an instrument payable at a bank.2 9
Checks, whether made out to order or to bearer, are treated as negotiable
instruments3 0 Holders of such instruments can be holders in due course
also. 31
Existing Article 3 requires that a negotiable instrument state a "sum
certain. '8 2 The requirement of a sum certain is completely eliminated in
revised Article 3.33 Rather than a sum certain, an instrument must show a
"fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order."'3 ' Rates of interest may be stated as
"fixed or variable."' Revised Article 3 assures that variable rate instruments will be negotiable.36
The concept of good faith is expanded in revised Article 3. Under section 3-103(a)(4), the definition of "good faith" is expanded to include the
observance of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." 7 This
makes it harder for the holder of a note or a check to enforce the payment obligation when the maker of the note or the drawer of a check has
a good reason not to make payment; such as fraud, want of consideration,
or breach of warranty.
Revised Article 3 classifies money orders as ordinary checks so as to
preserve the right to stop payment if the instrument is lost or there is a
problem in the transaction.38 Revised Article 3 also clarifies that traveler's
39
checks are subject to Article 3.

Existing Article 3 provides rules for determining when a cause of action
0
arises or accrues under Article 3.4
Revised Article 3 adds a statute of
1
limitations' prescribing the time periods within which any action under
28. Id.

29. U.C.C. § 3-104(c) (1990).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 3-104 cmt. 2.
32. U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b) (1962) (amended 1990).

33. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (1990).
34, Id.§ 3-104(a).
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 3-112(b).
§§ 3-104(a), 3-112(b).
§ 3-103(a)(4).
§ 3-104(f).

39. Id. § 3-104(i).
40. U.C.C. § 3-122 (1962). (The 1990 revision to U.C.C. Article 3 omitted this section.)
41. U.C.C. § 3-118 (1990).
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Article 3 must be brought.43 Also, under revised Article 3, the drawer of a
check that has been stolen from a payee is protected under section 3-310
against suit on both the instrument and the underlying obligation, allowing only the former which requires protection from double liability by
bond.

48

Existing Article 3 is silent on the question of accord and satisfaction.
Revised Article 3 creates a framework within which the rights of the parties are protected. Section 3-311 protects the drawer of a full settlement
check from it being endorsed with protest, thereby losing the money, and
still being liable on the balance of the claim.44 Creditor-payees under section 3-311 can avoid unintentional accord and satisfaction by returning
to be sent to a parthe funds 45 or by giving a notice that requires checks
46
ticular office where such proposals can be handled.
Revised Article 3 in section 3-307 better protects drawers and persons
owing fiduciary responsibilities by imposing stricter standards for obtaining holder in due course rights by a person dealing with a dishonest
agent or fiduciary. 47 As revised, Article 3 also spells out the circumstances
under which a person receiving 4funds has notice of a breach of fiduciary
duty and the resulting liability. "

An employee under section 3-402 of revised Article 3 is permitted to
show that the parties did not intend the employee to be personally liable
on an instrument he or she signs.4" Section 3-402 affords full protection to
an employee signing a corporate check who does not show agency status,
except as against a holder in due course." Revised Article 3, in section 3403(b), makes it clear that a signature of an organization is considered
unauthorized if two or more signatures are required and one signature is
missing."
As in the existing Article 3, the risk of endorsements by impostors and
those of dishonest employees who are allowed to sign checks is placed on
the drawer or employer,52 but revised Article 3 does not ignore any negligence of the person or bank that takes the check."' Revised Article 3 in
section 3-405 also clarifies and limits the scope of the per se negligence
42.

Id.

43. See id. § 3-310 cmt. 3.
44. Id. § 3-311.
45. Id. § 3-311(c)(2).
46. Id. § 3-311(c)(1).
47. Id. § 3-307(b).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 3-402(b)(2).
50. Id. § 3-402.
51. id. § 3-403(b).
52. Id, § 3-404.
53. Id. § 3-404(d).
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rule that imposes on employers the risk of forged endorsements by faithless employees who supply names of payees and makes relevant the negligence of the person or bank who later takes the instrument."
By allowing compensation to the holder in the case of wrongful dishonor by the bank, revised Article 3 in section 3-411 and related provisions considerably improve the acceptability of bank obligations like
cashier's checks or teller's checks as cash equivalents to close deals and
pay off loans." In addition, revised Article 3 clarifies in section 3-420 that
a person whose endorsement is forged, such as a payee whose check is
stolen, can sue one depositary bank with which the culprit dealt, rather
than having to sue each drawee on the checks involved."
Revised Article 3 also adds a definition of ordinary care in section 3103(a)(7) which makes clear that financial institutions taking checks for
processing or payment by automated means need not manually handle
the instrument if that is consistent with the institution's procedures and
does not vary unreasonably from general usage designed to accommodate
and facilitate efficiency, lowering costs, and lowering expedited funds
availability risk."' The definition of ordinary care relates to those specific
instances in Article 3 where the standard of ordinary care is set forth."
In section 3-501(b)(1), revised Article 3 permits presentment by electronic communication." One of the impediments to truncation of checks
is eliminated by this revision.
C. Summary of Revisions to Article 4
Article 4, entitled "Bank Deposits and Collections," the companion to
Article 3, has been amended to take care of immediate problems that,
have developed since Article 4 has been in effect and to update the law
pertaining to certain banking practices. The amendments to Article 4, for
example, give banks the opportunity to utilize the best technology in the
processing of checks.
The majority of the amendments to Article 4 are for clarification and
do not amount to any substantive change in existing sections of Article 4.
There are some key amendments that should be noted. Amended Article
4 permits "electronic presentment" agreements, s° a concept never contemplated in existing Article 4."1 An electronic presentment agreement
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 3-405(b).
§ 3-411(b).
§ 3-420(a), cmt. 3.
§ 3-103(a)(7).
§ 3-103(a)(7), cnt. 5.

59. Id. § 3-501(b)(1).
60. Id. § 4-110(a), cmt. 1.
61. Prior to the 1990 version of Article 4, this concept was not addressed by the Code.
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between a bank and a customer allows a bank to present an "item" for
payment by "transmission of an image of an item or information describing the item ('presentment notice') rather than delivery of the item itself."6 2 Rather than deliver the check itself, an image of the check or encoded information of some sort is transmitted. The technology is
available to permit such truncation of actual delivery of an instrument.
The use of the technology saves time and money.
Amended Article 4 contains a statute of limitations upon actions to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under Article 4. The statute of
limitations is three years after the cause of action accrues.' Existing Article 4 has no express statute of limitations, and this omission is corrected
in the amended version."'
Amended Article 4 sets forth "encoding" and "retention" warranties. 6
Encoding warranties are warranties from one who encodes information
with respect to an item that the information is correctly encoded. 7 Retention warranties refer to those who present items pursuant to an electronic presentment agreement and retain the original instrument while
transmitting an image of it as presentation for payment. 8
Amended Article 4 in section 4-401 relieves a joint account customer
from liability for an overdraft drawn by the other customer unless otherwise agreed, or unless the customer benefitted from it." It also gives the
customer a way to protect against the early cashing of a post-dated
check70 or a right of recovery if the bank pays the check after notice to it
by the customer."
Amended Article 4 in section 4-403 allows a customer on an account or
any person authorized to draw on the account to stop payment or to close
the account72 and clarifies that damages for failure to obey a valid stop
include damages for the wrongful dishonor of later items that are dishonored because the stop order was ignored and the earlier check was paid. 3
Section 4-406, in amended Article 4, increases the outside time a customer has to report forgeries or alterations by the same wrongdoer to
62. U.C.C. § 4-110(a) (1990).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 4-111.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.

§ 4-209(a).

68. Id. § 4-209(b).
69. Id. § 4-401(b).
70.

Id. § 4-401(c).

71. Id.
72, Id.
73. Id.

§ 4-403(a).
§ 4-403(c).
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thirty days.74 It also requires item retention or the capacity to furnish
legible copies for seven years in the case of truncation. 5
D. Reasons for Revisions
The NCCUSL in adopting revised Article 3 and the miscellaneous and
conforming amendments to Articles 1 and 4 did so after a lengthy process
that began in 1978. Revised Article 3 and the amendments to Article 4
are a necessary modernization to accommodate changing business practices. At the time Articles 3 and 4 were drafted, only banks offered checking accounts. Today, banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and other
institutions offer accounts upon which checks and other payment orders
can be drawn, but only banks and checks are clearly governed under existing Article 3.
Much of the language in existing Article 3 is unnecessarily technical
and archaic. Revised Article 3 substitutes language that can be understood in the twentieth century business world. The revision reorganizes
the material in a more logical sequence and significantly modernizes the
area.
Revised Article 3 and the amendments to Article 4 fix problems that
have arisen after the past forty years of experience with the U.C.C. and
negotiable instruments, and provide a framework for check truncation.
E. Status in Georgia
The Georgia U.C.C. Committee will be reviewing revised Article 3 and
the miscellaneous and corresponding amendments to Articles 1 and 4. A
thorough analysis of Georgia's version of existing Articles 3 and 4 will be
undertaken, and the Committee, expects to submit its report and recommendations to the Board of Governors of the State Bar in the fall of 1992.
Of special concern to the Committee will be the existing nonuniform
amendments to existing Articles 3 and 4 that have been adopted in Georgia, and the impact, if any, adoption of revised Article 3 and the corresponding and miscellaneous amendments to Articles 1 and 4 would have
on these nonuniform amendments. The earliest that revised Article 3 and
the amendments to Articles I and 4 would be introduced into the Georgia
General Assembly would be in January 1993.

74.

Id. § 4-406(d).

75.

Id. § 4-406(b).
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III. ARTICLE 4A-FUNDS TRANSFERS
A.

Background

Another outgrowth of the A.L..'s "Payments Code" project was the
76
drafting of new Article 4A governing wholesale wire transfers of funds.
Payment by check is governed by Articles 3 and 4. Payment by credit
card, as well as other point-of-sale consumer transactions, is largely the
subject of federal regulation. 7 Another type of payment, which has overtaken in dollar volume payments made by checks and credit cards, is the
wire transfer, principally through the Federal Reserve wire transfer network ("Fedwire") and the New York Clearing House Interbank Payments
System ("CHIPS"). Despite its significance to the economy, prior to the
advent of Article 4A, wholesale wire transfers were not subject to comprehensive treatment by state or federal law.
B. Summary of Article 4A
The following is a summary of Article 4A (references to section numbers in Article 4A begin with "4A").
Scope and Definitions. Article 4A is divided into five parts: part 1,
subject matter and definitions; part 2, issue and acceptance of payment
orders; part 3, execution of sender's payment order by receiving bank;
part 4, payment; part 5, miscellaneous provisions.
Generally, Article 4A applies only to wholesale wire transfers." It does
not apply to any transfer any part of which is governed by the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA") or Regulation E.7 Consequently, any
transfer involving a consumer-purpose account and governed by Regulation E would not be governed by Article 4A.80
76. U.C.C. Art. 4A (1989) Official Prefatory Note, reprintedin 2B U.L.A. 456-63 (1991).
77. E.g., the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1988); the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1604, 1631-1646, 1661-1665(a), 1666-1666(j), 1667-1667(e) (1988);
and the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1988).
78. U.C.C. § 4A-102, cmt. (1989).
79. Id. § 4A-108.
80. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 1990 adopted amendments to Regulation J,.which governs funds transfers through the Federal Reserve's funds
transfer system known as Fedwire. The amendments incorporated the uniform version of
Article 4A in whole with minor variations and took effect January 1, 1991. Thus, all funds
transfers that take place through Fedwire are governed by Article 4A. The Board of Governors took this action based upon its assumption that the various states would enact Article
4A in its uniform version and with the desire to have all funds transfers governed by the
same set of rules. Article 4A was incorporated into Subpart B of Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. §
210. All funds transfers through Fedwire, including those involving beneficiaries or originators that are consumers, are now governed by Article 4A as incorporated into Regulation J.
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Article 4A does apply to funds transfers through an automated
clearinghouse ("ACH"),, as long as they are not covered by EFTA or Regulation E.8' Only credit transfers are covered by Article 4A; not debit
transfers."2 Thus, Article 4A only covers a transfer initiated by the payor
transferring funds out of the payor's account.
Article 4A provides that most, but not all, of its provisions can be varied by agreement or a funds transfer system rule.88 Additionally, a funds
transfer system rule can bind parties to a funds transfer that used the
funds transfer system but were8 not direct participants in the system, if
such parties are put on notice. '

A "'[flunds transfer' means the series of transactions, beginning with
the originator's payment order, made for the purpose of making payment
to the beneficiary of the order."8 6 A" '[playment order' [is] an instruction
of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, or in
writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable
amount of money to a beneficiary ... ."" The instruction may not contain any conditions, other than the time of payment, and the receiving
bank must have a right of reimbursement from the sender.8
The parties to a payment order are the sender, receiving bank, beneficiary, and beneficiary's bank.8 8 The "'[s]ender' [is] the person giving the
instruction to the receiving bank,"88 and the "'[r]eceiving bank' [is] the
bank to which a sender's instruction is addressed." 0 The "'[b]eneficiary'
[is] the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank."'" The
"[bleneficiary's bank" is the bank identified in a payment order in which
an account of the beneficiary is to be credited or which is otherwise to
12 C.F.R. § 210.25 (1990). For an in depth discussion of Article 4A and its provisions, see
Fred H. Miller & William B. Davenport, Introduction to the Special Issue on the Uniform
Commercial Code, 45 Bus. LAw. 1389 (1990).
81. U.C.C. § 4A-108, cmt. (1989).
82. Id. § 4A-103(a)(1)(ii).
83. Id. § 4A-501.
84. Id. § 4A-404(b). Subpart B of Regulation J permits Fedwire participants to provide
this notice. Subpart B will govern all parties to a funds transfer that utilizes Fedwire if
notice is given. 12 C.F.R. § 210.28(c), § 210.29(b) (1990). In addition, Subpart B will preempt any other agreements or rules. Id. § 210.25(b).
85. U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (1989).
86. Id. § 4A-103(a)(1).
87. Id. § 4A-103(a)(1)(i), (ii). Pursuant to Subpart B of Regulation J, some messages
through Fedwire will not be treated as payment orders. 12 C.F.R. § 210.26(i) (1990). Automated clearinghouse messages and others described in the Operating Circulars are not payment orders. Id.
88. See U.C.C. § 4A-103 (1989).
89. Id. § 4A-103(a)(5).
90. Id. § 4A-103(a)(4).
91. Id. § 4A-103(a)(2).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

make payment to the beneficiary. 2 An "'[intermediary bank' [is] a receiving bank other than the originator's bank or-the beneficiary's bank."' 8
The parties to a complete funds transfer include the originator, originator's bank, any intermediary banks, beneficiary, and beneficiary's bank.'
The "'[o)riginator' [is] the sender of the first payment order in a funds
transfer."" The "[olriginator's bank" is the receiving bank on the first
payment order in a funds transfer or the originator if the originator is a
bank."
A "'[flunds-transfer business day' of a receiving bank [is] the part of a
day during which the receiving bank is open for receipt, processing, and
transmittal of payment orders and cancellations and amendments
"9 A receiving bank may fix a cut-off time or times on a funds...
transfer business day for receiving and processing payment orders, cancellations, or amendments.' 8 Different cut-off times may apply to different types of communications such as payment orders, cancellations or
amendments, and different senders or different categories of payment orders." If a payment order, or other communication, arrives after the close
of a funds-transfer business day or a specified cut-off time, the receiving
bank may treat it as having been received at the opening of the next
funds-transfer business day.100
The following are examples of several funds transfers and the parties
involved.
1. X sends a payment order to her bank, Friendly Bank, to pay $1,000
to Y, who also has an account at Friendly Bank. X is the sender and
originator. Friendly Bank is the receiving bank, originator's bank, and
beneficiary's bank. Y is the beneficiary.
2. X sends a payment order to her bank, Friendly Bank, ordering credit
of $1,000 to Y's account at Best Bank. Friendly Bank then sends a payment order to its correspondent, Best Bank, ordering a credit of $1,000 to
the account of Y. X is the originator of the funds transfer and sender of
the first payment order. Friendly Bank is the originator's bank, the receiving bank of the first payment order, and the sender of the second
92. Id. § 4A-103(a)(3). Pursuant to Subpart B of Regulation J, a "beneficiary's bank"
includes a Federal Reserve Bank that receives a payment order as a beneficiary. 12 C.F.R. §
210.26(d) (1990). A Federal Reserve Bank also need not be identified in a payment order as
a beneficiary's bank if it functions as one. Id.

93. U.C.C. § 4A-104(b) (1989).
94. See id. § 4A-104.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

100. Id.

§ 4A-104(c).
§ 4A-104(d).
§ 4A-105(a)(4).
§ 4A-106(a).
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payment order. Best Bank is the receiving bank of the second payment
order and the beneficiary's bank. Y is the beneficiary.
3. X sends a payment order to her bank, Friendly Bank, ordering credit
of $1,000 to Y's account at Best Bank. Friendly Bank is not a correspondent of Best Bank, so Friendly Bank sends a payment order to Federal
Reserve Bank which then sends a payment order to Best Bank. X is the
originator and sender of the first payment order. Friendly Bank is the
originator's bank, receiving bank of the first payment order, and sender of
the second payment order. Federal Reserve Bank is an intermediary
bank, receiving bank of the second payment order, and sender of the
third payment order. Best Bank is the beneficiary's bank and receiving
bank of the third payment order. Y is the beneficiary.
Payment Orders. A receiving bank and a beneficiary's bank are
under no obligation to the sender or beneficiary of a payment order until
the bank "accepts" the payment order. 10 ' "[A] receiving bank other than
the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order when it executes the order. 10 2 A payment order is "executed" when the receiving bank issues a
payment order intended to carry out the payment order received by that
bank.108 A receiving bank has no duty to execute a payment order without
an agreement to the contrary. 10'
A beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order at the earliest of the following events: (1) when the bank either pays the beneficiary or notifies
the beneficiary of receipt of the order or that the account of the beneficiary has been credited, unless the notice indicates that the bank is rejecting the order or that the funds may not be withdrawn;10 5 (2) "when
the bank receives payment of the entire amount of the sender's order";'"
or, (3) the opening of the next funds-transfer business day following the
payment date of the order if at that time the beneficiary's bank has been
paid in full, unless the payment order was rejected before that time or
within one hour after that time, or one hour after opening of the next
funds-transfer business day of the sender, if that is later.10 7 A beneficiary's bank that does not reject a payment order eventually becomes obligated to the beneficiary by passage of time if the beneficiary's bank is
08
paid.
101.

Id. §§ 4A-403, -404, -209, cmts. 3, 5.

102.

Id. § 4A-209(a).

103.
104.

Id. § 4A-301(a).
Id. § 4A-209 cmt. 3.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107.

§ 4A-209(b)(1).
§ 4A-209(b)(2).

Id. § 4A-209(b)(3).

108. Id.
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A receiving bank may reject a payment order by a notice of rejection
given to the sender orally, electronically, or in writing. 0 Rejection is effective when the notice is given if it is transmitted by a reasonable means
under the circumstances. 1 0 The sender and receiving bank can establish a
means of transmission for rejections by an agreement."' Acceptance of a
payment order precludes a later rejection and vice versa. 1
There is no requirement that a receiving bank, other than the beneficiary's bank, reject a payment order because there is no acceptance unless
it executes the order.' 13 If the receiving bank, however, does not reject or
accept a payment order and there were sufficient withdrawable credit in a
noninterest-bearing account of the sender with the receiving bank on the
execution date, the receiving bank would be obligated to pay interest to
the sender from the execution
date until the order is cancelled or the
4
sender receives notice."
A payment order may be cancelled or amended."' A communication
cancelling or amending a payment order is effective if given to the receiving bank in a time and manner affording the receiving bank a reasonable
opportunity to act on it before acceptance of the original payment order." An unaccepted payment order is deemed cancelled at the close of
the fifth funds-transfer business
day of the receiving bank after the exe7
cution date or payment date."
"After a payment order has been accepted, a cancellation or amendment of the order is not effective unless the receiving bank agrees or a
funds-transfer system rule allows cancellation or amendment without
agreement. . . ."1 A cancellation or amendment will not be effective as
to a receiving bank, other than the beneficiary's bank, unless the receiving bank issues a conforming cancellation or amendment.1 1 9 A cancellation or amendment of a payment order already accepted by a benefiId. § 4A-210(a).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 4A-210(d). Under Subpart B of Regulation J, a sender must make arrangements with a Federal Reserve Bank before it can send payment orders through Fedwire. 12
C.F.R. § 210.30(a) (1990). Federal Reserve Banks reserve the right to reject or impose conditions on acceptance of payment orders. Id.
113. U.C.C. § 4A-210(b) (1989).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 4A-211(a).
116. Id. § 4A-211(b).
117. Id. § 4A-211(d).
118. Id. § 4A-211(c).
119. Id. § 4A-211(c)(1).
109.
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ciary's bank is not effective unless the original payment order was
unauthorized or a mistake.'2 0
Unauthorized or Erroneous Payment Orders. Article 4A provides for use of a "security procedure.""2 ' A security procedure is a procedure established by an agreement between a customer having an account
with a bank and a receiving bank."' The purpose of this procedure is to
verify that a payment order, amendment, or cancellation is authorized or
to detect errors in transmission or content of the payment order, amendment, or cancellation.12 3 Signature comparison is not by itself a security
procedure.12 " A security procedure is used to verify the authenticity or
accuracy of a payment order or other communication.'" It can also be
used to allocate risk of loss to the receiving bank if it is not used properly
or was not adequate.' 6
A payment order is authorized if the customer or an agent authorized
it."' In addition, a payment order is effective, where the customer and
the bank agree to use security procedures to verify it, if the security procedure is commercially reasonable to detect unauthorized payment orders
and the bank accepts it in good faith and in compliance with the security
procedure and any other written agreement or instructions that are not
inconsistent with the security procedure or existing agreement.12 8
Whether a security procedure is commercially reasonable will depend
upon the wishes of the customer, circumstances known to the bank including size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally issued by
the customer, and security procedures generally in use among similarly
situated parties.'' A security procedure will be deemed commercially reasonable if it was chosen by the customer after the customer refused another commercially reasonable security procedure offered by the bank
and expressly agreed in writing to be bound by any payment order accepted by the bank in compliance with the customer's security
procedure.' 0
Id. § 4A-211(c)(2).
121. Id. § 4A-201.
122. Id.
120.

123. Id.

124. Id.
125.

Id.

126. Id. § 4A-201 cmt.
127.
128.

Id. § 4A-202(a).
Id. § 4A-202(b).

129, Id. § 4A-202(c).
130. Id.
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The receiving bank may, by express written agreement, agree, to limit
its ability to retain payment for a verified payment order.131 Even if verified, the receiving bank will be required to repay such amount to the customer if the customer can prove that the payment order was not initiated
by anyone within its control.132
If a payment order accepted by the bank were not authorized or effective as the order of the customer, the bank would have to refund the
amount of the order plus interest.3s The customer would not, however,
be entitled to interest if it were not diligent in determining that the order
13
was unauthorized within a reasonable time not to exceed ninety days. '
The bank would still be required to refund the amount of the payment
order. 3'
An erroneous payment order is one accepted pursuant to a security
procedure for the detection of errors that was a duplicate of the original
or instructed payment to the wrong beneficiary or in a greater amount.136
If the sender can prove compliance with the security procedure and that
the error would not have occurred had the bank complied, then the
sender will not be liable to pay the order or any amount in excess of the
correct amount.1 7 If the sender, however, negligently fails to discover the
error within a reasonable time not to exceed ninety days of receipt of
notice as to the acceptance of the order, the sender will be liable to the
receiving bank for any loss incurred by the bank as a result of the delay,
up to the amount of the original order. '
If a payment order received by the beneficiary's bank describes a nonexistent or unidentifiable person or account, there would be no beneficiary, and the payment order could not be accepted."' A payment order
may describe the beneficiary by name and account number and the name
and account number could describe different persons.14 0 If the beneficiary's bank does not know that the name and number refer to different
persons, it may rely on the number.14 If the beneficiary's bank pays the
person identified by name, or knows of the discrepancy, no person has
rights as the beneficiary except the person paid if it was the person in131.
132.
133.
134.
(1990).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. § 4A-203(a)(1).
Id. § 4A-203(a)(2).
Id.§ 4A-204(a).
Id. Subpart B of Regulation J provides 30 calendar days 12 C.F.R.
U.C.C. § 4A-204(a) (1989).
Id. § 4A-205(a).
Id. § 4A-205(a)(1).
Id. § 4A-205(b).
Id. § 4A-207(a).
Id. § 4A-207 cmt. 2.
Id. § 4A-207(b)(1).

§ 210.28(c)
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tended to be paid by the originator. " ' When the beneficiary's bank rightfully pays a person identified by number, the originator, if it is a bank, is
required to pay."4 3 If the originator is not a bank, and it proves the person
paid was not the intended beneficiary, the originator is not required to
pay unless the originator's bank proves the originator had notice that the
beneficiary's bank might rely on the number.1 4 4 If the person paid was
not entitled to be paid, either the originator or the originator's bank may
recover from that person. '

What happens if there are discrepancies in describing intermediary
banks and beneficiary's banks? Article 4A responds to this question by
stating that if the bank is only described by number, the receiving bank
may rely on the number and need not investigate further."" The sender
must reimburse the receiving bank for any losses or expenses incurred
7
due to the bank's reliance on the number.14
The intermediary or beneficiary's bank may be identified by name and
number where the name and number identify different persons. ' If the
sender is a bank, the receiving bank may rely on the number to identify
the bank if the receiving bank does 'not know of the discrepancy; the
sender must reimburse the receiving bank for any losses or expenses due
to its reliance on the number. 149 If the sender is not a bank, and the
sender had prior notice that the receiving bank might rely on the number,
then the receiving bank may rely on the number.'"0 In any case, the receiving bank may rely on the name if it does not know of the discrepancy. 1' 5 If the receiving bank knows
of the discrepancy, it may not rely on
2
either the name or number.'5
Execution of Payment Orders. Article 4A, as previously mentioned, places on a receiving bank no duty to execute a payment order.""
If it does execute,, however, it must do so properly. The receiving bank
must issue, on the execution date, a payment order complying with the
142. Id. § 4A-207(b)(2).
143. Id. § 4A-207(c)(1).
144. Id. § 4A-207(c)(2). Subpart B of Regulation J provides this notice to originators
that are not banks, such as the Department of the Treasury. 12 CF.R. § 210.27 & Appendix
A, Commentary to § 210.27 (1990)
145. U.C.C. § 4A-207(d) (1989).

146. Id. § 4A-208(a)(1).
147. Id. § 4A-208(a)(2).

148.
149.
150.
that a
151.
152,
153,

Id. § 4A-208(b)(1).
Id.
Id. § 4A-208(b)(2). Subpart B of Regulation J provides notice to nonbank senders
receiving bank may rely on the number. 12 C.F.R. § 210.27(a) (1990).
U.C.C. § 4A-208(b)(3) (1989).
Id. § 4A-208(b)(4).
See supra note 85.
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sender's order and follow the sender's instructions regarding an intermediary or funds-transfer system to be used or the means for transmission." 4 The receiving bank need not, however, use the funds-transfer system designated if it determines in good faith that its use would cause
delay."'
If the payment order requires telephonic, wire, or the most expeditious
means of transmission, the receiving bank must use the most expeditious
means available and must so instruct intermediaries. s6 If the payment
order specifies a payment date, the receiving bank must act to allow payment on or as soon after the payment date as feasible. 57 If there is no
such instruction, it may transmit by first class mail or any other reasonable method. 58 Unless otherwise instructed, a receiving bank may use any
funds-transfer system reasonable under the circumstances and issue payment orders to an intermediary bank as long as reasonable care is used in
selecting the bank."'
A receiving bank, unless instructed by the sender, may not collect its
fees and expenses for the transfer by reducing the amount of the payment
order it issues. 00
If a receiving bank executes an order for a greater amount than the
order it received, including a duplicate order, it may be paid only in the
amount of the order it received.0' If the receiving bank executes the payment order in a lesser amount, it may be paid the full amount if it issues
a correcting order. 62 Otherwise, the receiving bank is only entitled to
payment in the amount of the order it issued. 6' If a receiving bank issues
a payment order to the wrong beneficiary, all prior senders are released
from any obligation to pay.16'
A sender of an erroneous payment order who receives notice from the
receiving bank that the payment order was executed has a duty to exercise ordinary care to discover and report the error within a reasonable
154. U.C.C. § 4A-302(a)(1) (1989).
155. Id. § 4A-302(b). In addition, Subpart B of Regulation J provides that a sender may
not require a Federal Reserve Bank to use a funds-transfer system other than Fedwire unless it agrees in writing. 12 C.F.R. § 210.30(b) (1990).
156. U.C.C. § 4A-302(a)(2) (1989).

157. Id.
158. Id. § 4A-302(c). Subpart B of Regulation J provides that unles4 otherwise agreed,
senders may not require execution on a day other than the day the payment order is issued.
12 C.F.R. § 210.30(c) (1990).
159. U.C.C. § 4A-302(b) (1989).

160. Id. § 4A-302(d).
161. Id. § 4A-303(a).
162. Id. § 4A-303(b).

163. Id.
164.

Id.

§ 4A-303(c).
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time. 5 A reasonable time means not greater than ninety days after receipt of the notice.1 es If the sender fails to exercise ordinary care in discovering whether the order was erroneously executed, it is not entitled to
interest." 7
If a funds transfer is completed, but was delayed due to a receiving
bank's failure to execute promptly or properly, the bank must pay interest to either the originator or the beneficiary for the period of delay
caused by the improper execution.6 s Where the error in execution results
in noncompletion of the funds transfer, failure to use a designated intermediary, issuance of a noncomplying payment order, or where a receiving
bank violates an agreement to accept a payment order, the bank is liable
to the originator for its expenses and interest losses."' Consequential
damages are only recoverable to the extent provided for in an express
written agreement.170 Reasonable attorney fees may be recovered if demand for compensation for lost interest and expenses is made and refused before suit. M Liability under this provision for basic interest and

expenses cannot be varied by agreement."'
Payment. The payment date, the day on which the amount of the
order is payable to the beneficiary by the beneficiary's bank, may be specified in the order, but cannot be earlier than the date the order is received
by the beneficiary's bank. 7 3 If no payment7 date is specified, it will be the
day of receipt by the beneficiary's bank.' '

Generally, the sender of a payment order becomes obligated to pay the
beneficiary's bank the amount of the order on acceptance, but payment is
not due until the payment date." Similarly, a sender is obligated to pay
165.

Id. § 4A-304.

166. Id. Subpart B of Regulation J provides for 30 calendar days. 12 C.F.R. § 210.28(c)
(1990).
167. U.C.C. § 4A-304 (1989).
168. Id. § 4A-305(a).
169. Id. § 4A-305(b).
170. Id. § 4A-305(c). Subpart B of Regulation J provides that a Federal Reserve Bank
shall not agree to be liable for consequential damages. 12 C.F.R. § 210.32(a) (1990).
171. U.C.C. § 4A-305(e) (1989).

172. Id. § 4A-305(f). Subpart B of Regulation J provides that where interest is payable
to or by a Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank may apply an "as of adjustment" or pay interest to the appropriate party. 12 C.F.R. § 210.32(b)(1) (1990). An "as of
adjustment" is an adjustment to a reserve or clearing account to the appropriate party for
reserve or clearing balance maintenance only. If the sender or receiving bank that receives
the "as of adjustment" is not the party entitled to the payment, it shall pass it through as

interest. Id. § 210.32(b)(2).
173.

U.C.C. § 4A-401 (1989).

174. Id.
175. Id. § 4A-402(b).
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the amount of a payment order to a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank upon acceptance, but payment is not due until the execution
date. 7 The obligation to pay, however, is excused if the funds transfer1 7is
not completed due to the beneficiary's bank not accepting the order.
In cases where a sender paid the amount of an order it was not obligated to pay, the bank receiving payment must refund any amounts the
sender was not.obligated to pay, together with interest, if applicable. 7 ' If
an intermediary bank suspends payments and thus cannot make a refund
as required, a sender which sent an order to that intermediary bank pursuant to instructions is entitled to receive or retain payment from its
sender. 179 Otherwise, where the sender chose the intermediary bank, the
sender would bear the loss.'
Payment by the sender to the receiving bank occurs in one of the following ways: (1) if the sender is a bank, when final settlement occurs
through Fedwire or a funds-transfer system; 18 (2) if the sender is a bank
and the payment is credited to an account of the receiving bank, when
the credit is withdrawn or at midnight on the day on which the credit is
withdrawable and the receiving bank learns of that fact;'68 or, (3) if the
receiving bank debits an account of the sender, when the debit of withdrawable credit is made.6 83 A funds-transfer system that settles by netting payments is permitted.'' Any such netting or set off is payment
when it becomes final. 8 ' When a beneficiary's bank accepts a payment
order, it is obligated to pay the beneficiary.'80 Payment is due on the payment date, unless acceptance occurs after the close of the funds-transfer
business day, in which case payment is due the next funds-transfer busi176.

Id. § 4A-402(c).

177. Id.
178. Id. § 4A-402(d).
179. Id. § '4A-402(e).

180. Id.
181. Id. § 4A-403(a)(1).
182.
183.

Id, § 4A-403(a)(2).
Id. § 4A-403(a)(3).

184. Id. § 4A-403(b).
185. Id. Subpart B of Regulation J provides that payment shall be made by a sender to a
Federal Reserve Bank. 12 C.F.R. § 210.28(a) (1990). There is no right to overdraw an account with a Federal Reserve Bank. Id. § 210.28(b)(1). If an overdraft is created, it is due
and payable immediately without demand at the earliest of the end of the funds-transfer
business day or when the Federal Reserve Bank deems itself insecure and gives notice to the
sender, or when the sender suspends payments. Id. By sending a payment order to a Federal
Reserve Bank, a sender grants the bank a security interest in all of the sender's assets in
possession of or held for the account of the Federal Reserve Bank to secure any overdrafts.
Id. § 210.28(b)(2).
186. U.C.C. § 4A-404(a) (1989).
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ness day.18' If the beneficiary's bank fails to pay, after demand and notice
of particular circumstances giving rise to consequential damages, it may
be liable for consequential damages. 18a However, if the beneficiary's bank
proves it did not pay because of a reasonable doubt regarding the right of
the beneficiary to payment, then the beneficiary's bank will not be liable
for consequential damages. 18 '
If the payment order provides for payment to an account of the beneficiary, the beneficiary's bank must provide notice to the beneficiary before
midnight of the next funds-transfer business day after the payment
date. 1'0 Failure to give such notice or other notice required in an order
gives rise to an obligation to pay interest to the beneficiary. e The beneficiary can also recover attorney fees if it demands interest and the demand
cannot be varied by
is refused."" The right to receive these damages
193
rule.
system
funds-transfer
a
agreement or
The obligation of the beneficiary's bank to pay the beneficiary after
acceptance cannot be made subject to conditions or an agreement to return the funds if the bank is not paid, and any such condition or agreement is not enforceable. 9 ' A funds-transfer system rule, however, may
provide that payments are provisional until the bank is paid.'9 The beneficiary's bank may obtain a refund from the beneficiary if it and the originator were on notice that the transfer was provisional, the beneficiary, the
beneficiary's bank, and originator's bank agreed to be bound by the rule,
and the beneficiary's bank did not receive payment. 19 There is also a
special rule for funds-transfer systems that net payments multilaterally
among the participants and have a loss-sharing agreement to complete
settlement."'7
Except for payment orders that are cancelled or where a beneficiary is
required to refund a payment, the originator pays the beneficiary when
the beneficiary's bank accepts the payment order for the benefit of the
187.

Id.

188.

Id.

189. Id.

190. Id. § 4A-404(b).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193.

Id. § 4A-404(c). Subpart B of Regulation J provides that payment to a beneficiary

where the Federal Reserve Bank is the beneficiary's bank occurs on the earlier of when the
amount is credited to the beneficiary's account or notice is sent to the beneficiary. 12 C.F.R.
§210.31(b) (1990).
194. U.C.C. § 4A-405(c) (1989).
195. Id. § 4A-405(d).

196. Id.
197.

Id. § 4A-405(e).
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beneficiary and in the amount of that order.1 "8Such payment discharges
the originator's obligation to the beneficiary unless payment was not
made in accordance with their agreement and such action resulted in a
loss to the beneficiary. 1 "9
Miscellaneous. The rate of interest to be applied when interest is
required to be paid is set forth in section 4A-506.100 The rate can be determined by agreement or funds-transfer system rule.' 1 If the interest
rate is not so determined, the applicable Federal Funds rate will be
applied.

2

Article 4A also provides rules for handling creditor process such as levies, garnishments, and attachments with respect to the funds transfer.205
There are also restrictions on injunctions or restraining orders that may
only affect the origination of a payment order to start a funds transfer,
the originator's bank from executing it, or a beneficiary's bank from releasing the funds.20' Banks may charge items and payment orders to an
account in any order and may treat credits first made as first
2
withdrawn.

05

Article 4A has also established a limitations period, similar to that for
checks in Article 4.20 If a customer does not notify his bank regarding an
improper debit to his account resulting from a payment order within one
year, he is precluded from doing so.207 Article 4A also sets out choice of

198. Id. § 4A-406(a).
199. Id. § 4A-406(b). Pursuant to Subpart B of Regulation J, a receiving bank of a pay-

ment order from a Federal Reserve Bank will be paid by a credit to that bank's Fed account. 12 C.F.R. § 210.31(a) (1990). A payment occurs at the earlier of the time when the
payment order is credited to the receiving bank's account or when it is sent to the receiving
bank. Id.
Some banks that receive payment orders from Federal Reserve Banks are "off-line

banks." An "off-line bank" transmits to or receives payment orders from a Federal Reserve
Bank by telephone or some means other than electronic data transmission. An off-line bank
that does not expressly notify its Federal Reserve Bank in writing that it maintains an account for a respondent bank warrants under Subpart B to Regulation J that it does not act
as a beneficiary's bank for a beneficiary that is a bank. Id. § 210.29(a)(4). The reason for this
section is to provide for prompt notice, by telephone, in cases where a payment order is
addressed to an off-line bank that is an intermediary or beneficiary's bank, rather than a
beneficiary. Prompt notice is necessary so that the off-line bank can then accept the order to
complete the funds transfer in a timely manner. Id. § 210.29 cmt.

200. U.C.C. § 4A-506 (1989).
201. Id. § 4A-506(a).

202. Id. § 4A-506(b).
203. Id. § 4A-502.
204. Id. § 4A-503.
205. Id. § 4A-504.
206. See id., § 4-111 (1990).
207. Id. § 4A-505 (1989).
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law provisions that permit the parties to a funds transfer to choose the
jurisdiction has no relationship to
applicable law, even though the chosen
20
the parties or the funds transfer.

8

C. Reasons for Adoption
Although large sums of money are transferred through wire transfers
and other electronic means, with an average of one trillion dollars on a
daily basis, previously only a patchwork of rules (such as previous Regulation J and private system rules, some customer agreements, and a very
small amount of case law) governed the rights and responsibilities of the
parties to such transfers.2 9 Judges have often had to resolve disputes by
referring to general principles of common law or equity, or they have
sought guidance in statutes such as Article 4, which are applicable to
other payment methods. These attempts to define rights and obligations
in funds transfers by general principles of law, by analogy to negotiable
instrument law, or by the law of check collection have been unsatisfactory
because of the unique characteristics of wholesale wire transfers. Some of
these characteristics are: the large dollar amounts of wholesale wire transfers and therefore the risk related thereto; the speed with which wire
transfers are effected; the cost of effecting wire transfers; and the sophistication of the parties to wholesale.wire transfers.2 1 .
Article 4A, when enacted into law by the various states, will provide a
comprehensive legal structure for a class of payments known as wholesale
funds transfers.2 1 The provisions of Article 4A were drafted through the
joint efforts of the NCCUSL, academics, bankers, corporate users of
funds transfers, and regulators. The final version of Article 4A represents
a compromise that attempts to strike a balance between the interest of
the public, the interest of the providers of funds-transfer services, and the

208. Id. § 4A-507.
209. U.C.C. Art. 4A (1989) Official Prefatory Note, reprinted in 2B U.L.A. 456-63 (1991).
210. Id.
211. Report of the Ad Hoc Payment Systems Laws Task Force to the Board of Directors
of the American Bankers Association on Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A Funds
Transfers, Nov. 21, 1989.
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and fully
users.2 ' As a result, the final version 1 has been well-drafted
21
debated by representatives of all the affected industries. '
The need for a comprehensive law governing the area of wholesale electronic funds transfers is apparent. It is also important, however, that the
laws in the various states be uniform to avoid uncertainty with respect to
the rules that may affect the parties to a particular transfer. Such parties
are very likely to be in different states. The need to avoid uncertainty is
heightened by the fact that large sums of money are transferred through
funds transfer networks in a fast, efficient, and inexpensive manner. If
the parties cannot be certain about the rules that will govern their actions
and relationships, the process will become less efficient and certainly
more expensive. Thus, it is very important that Article 4A be adopted
uniformly.

D.

Status in Georgia

Article 4A was introduced into the Georgia General Assembly in February 1991 as House Bill 762.215 House Bill 762 contains no substantive variations from the 1989 Official Text of Article 4A. 21' There are, however,
certain changes that have been made to the headings and cross-reference
notations in Article 4A that were required in order to make Article 4A
consistent with the formatting style used throughout Title 11 of the Georgia Code. The minor changes in style do not affect the substantive context of Article 4A.
Article 4A, prior to being introduced in the General Assembly, was reviewed by the Georgia U.C.C. Committee and was approved by the Board
of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia.

212.

Id.

213. As of November 1991, Article 4A had been adopted by the following states in its
uniform version: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montanta, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,

Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as well as the District of Columbia. (as reported by the American Law Institute).
214. See Fred H. Miller & William B. Davenport, Introduction to the Special Issue on
the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Bus. LAw. 1389 (1990).

215. House Bill 762 Feb. 1991.
216. Id.; U.C.C. Art. 4A (1989).
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IV.
A.

ARTICLE 6-BULK TRANSFERS

Background

Debtor misconduct during the Panic of 1893 was the motivating force
behind the enactment of bulk sales laws during the late 1890s and early
1900s. Failing merchants, saddled with depreciating goods and desperate
to avoid creditors,. liquidated their inventories in bulk. They then absconded with the proceeds and began business anew in distant locations.
Their apparent success inspired similar tactics by others who observed
the profit potential in such schemes. This continued until the practice
became widespread.2 7 Fraudulent conveyance laws, which at that time
had been in effect for hundreds of years, were unavailing where the purchaser in bulk gave adequate consideration and purchased in good
faith.2 18 In an effort to protect against these abuses, an organization
known as the National Association of Credit Men developed the2 1 bulk sale
statutes and lobbied for their enactment in the various states.
During the time that the Code was being drafted, the NCCUSL came
under pressure to produce a uniform law on bulk sales. Deciding that it
would be more efficient legislatively to include the bulk sales law in the
Code rather than having it separately enacted as a second uniform statute, the NCCUSL asked that the law be incorporated into the Code. This
marriage of convenience, which occurred in the late stages of the drafting
of the Code and was not met with enthusiasm by the drafters, may explain in part why Article 6 has been widely viewed as the most poorly
drafted portion of the Code.22
B. Summary of Existing Article 6 and Problems in Application
Article 6 requires that the parties to a bulk transfer not otherwise exempt from the article's coverage comply with four basic requirements: (1)
the seller must furnish the purchaser with a complete list of the seller's
creditors; (2) the parties must prepare in reasonable detail a schedule of
the property being transferred; (3) the purchaser must retain the list and
schedule and must either permit inspection and copying of the list and
schedule or file them in the public records; and (4) the purchaser must
217. See Thomas Clifford Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77
U. PA. L. REV. 72, 77-78 (1928).
218. State fraudulent conveyance laws had their origins in the 16th century Statute of
Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570), which rendered invalid any transfer of property made with
the intent of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors. See Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARv. L. REv. 495, 495-97 (1983).
219. See Billig, supra note 217, at 82-83.
220. See William D. Hawkland, Proposed Revisions to U.C.C. Article 6, 38 Bus. LAw.
1729, 1729-30 (1983).
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notify the seller's creditors of the transfer."' Failure by the parties to
comply with these requirements
renders the transfer ineffective against
222
creditors of the seller.

Despite its apparent simplicity, Article 6 proved burdensome to the
parties to bulk sales, particularly in transactions involving substantial
businesses having multiple locations and a large number of creditors.
Moreover, the parties often had legitimate business reasons for their reluctance to make detailed disclosures of the transaction to creditors. Consequently, the parties frequently structured their transactions to either
avoid the status of a statutory "bulk transfer" or to qualify for an exemption from Article 6's coverage. 2 3 In other cases, the parties affirmatively
elected not to comply with Article 6, relying instead on indemnification
agreements, escrow arrangements, and other contractual means to insure
the purchaser against loss from the claims of the seller's creditors. 4
Legal commentators and courts have had an equally difficult time with
Article 6.228 Problems in the interpretation and application of Article 6 in
221. U.C.C. §§ 6-104, -105, -107 (1962) (amended 1989).
222. Id. § 6-104(1). Article 6 does not set forth any procedure that a creditor must use in
exercising its rights in connection with a bulk transfer. However, Official Comment 2 to
U.C.C. § 6-104 indicates that the creditor may "disregard the transfer and levy on the goods
as still belonging to the transferor, or a receiver representing them can take them by
whatever procedure the local law provides." Id. § 6-104 cmt. 2. Official Comment 2 to U.C.C.
§ 6-111 provides that "levy" should be broadly construed to include not only levies of execution, but also attachment, garnishment, receivership "or whatever proceeding, under the
state's practice, is used to apply a debtor's property to payment of his debts." Id. § 6-111
cmt. 2. See generally William D. Hawkland, Remedies of Bulk Transfer Creditors Where
There Has Been Compliance With Article 6, 74 CoM. L.J. 257 (1969).
223. For example, the parties might omit all or a major portion of the inventory from a
sale of the business generally. Alternatively, the purchaser might assume the debts of the
seller and otherwise qualify for one of the exemptions from the Article 6 requirements afforded by U.C.C. § 6-103(6) or § 6-103(7) (1962) (amended 1989). The latter alternatives are
unattractive, however, since the statutory exemptions appear to require the assumption of
all debts, including both unknown and contingent claims.
224. In Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. P&F Indus., Inc., 63 A.D.2d 1014, 406 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d
Dept. 1978), the court indicated that a contractual indemnification, provided in lieu of Article 6 compliance, represented "standard business practice" and did not constitute a violation of the statute. 63 A.D.2d at 1015, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 358. Of course, indemnity agreements
are only as good as the creditworthiness of the indemnitor. There is also some risk that a
court would determine that conscious noncompliance constitutes concealment of the transfer so as to toll the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., In re Seminole Motors, Inc.,
86 B.R. 245 (E.D. Okla. 1987); Columbian Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co., 461 A.2d 312 (Pa.
Super. 1983); but see In re Dell Norte Depot, Inc., 716 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1983).
225. As early as 1963, Donald Rapson pointed out numerous problems in the drafting of
Article 6 and called for its "immediate redrafting and clarification." Donald J. Rapson, Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code; Problems and Pitfalls in Conducting Bulk Sales, 68
COM. L.J. 226 (1963). By 1975, at least two members of the American Bar Association's Article 6 Subcommittee called for the repeal of Article .6. Hawkland, supra note 220, at 1730.
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particular cases were'unsettling to potential bulk sale purchasers and
their lenders, who feared that noncompliance would subject the newly acquired assets to superior claims from the seller's creditors. 22 These fears
turned to nightmares when the seller became the debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 2 ' the trustee
(or Chapter 11 debtor) could exercise the Article 6 rights of any actual
unsecured creditor who did not receive proper notice of the bulk sale,
permitting avoidance of the entire transaction for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.22 s This result followed regardless of the size of the creditor's claim.
C.

Recommendations for Repeal or Revision

Efforts to reform Article 6 commenced in the late 1970s. 2 2 9 By 1982, the
Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the American Bar Association
had called for substantial revision of Article 6.230 The Article 6 Subcommittee report, undoubtedly coupled with the increased attention given to
Article 6 matters in the booming merger and acquisition days of the mid1980s, led to its reconsideration by the NCCUSL and A.L.I. beginning in
1985.
The NCCUSL and A.L.I. completed their study of Article 6 in 1988
with a joint recommendation that calls for the repeal of that portion of
the Code.2 3 1 In their judgment, Article 6 could no longer survive a costbenefit analysis. Devices such as credit reporting services, audited financial statements, and ready access to public lien filings enabled suppliers
and other creditors to make more informed decisions on extending credit.
Security, whether in the form of purchase money security interests in inventory or otherwise, was available to a concerned creditor on an inexpenRapson suggested that "statutory euthanasia" might be appropriate for Article 6. Donald J.
Rapson, U.C.C. Article 6: Should It Be Revised or "Deep-Sixed"?, 38 Bus. LAW. 1753, 1769
(1983).

226. See, e.g., In re McBee, 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally Steven L. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities,and Code Interpretation,39 VAND. L. REv. 179 (1986); and Steven L.
Harris, PracticingUnder Existing Bulk Sales Law-And a Look at the Future of Article 6,
22 UCC L.J. 195 (1990).
227. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988).
228. See, e.g., In re Verco .Industries, 10 B.R. 347 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 704 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1983).
229. See Hawkland, supra note 220, at 1730.
230. A series of articles on the proposal to revise Article 6 written by members of the
Committee was published in 1983. Hawkland, supra note 220; Rapson, supra note 225; and
Don L. Baker, Bulk Transfers Act-Patch, Bury or Renovate?, 38 Bus. LAW. 1771 (1983).
231. U.C.C. Art. 6,(1989) Editor's Note to 1980 Alternative Texts [Repeal and Revision]
for Article 6, reprinted in part in Code Index, U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan).
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sive basis. In addition, modern jurisdictional statutes and ease of interstate service of process made it unlikely that a fraudulent seller in a bulk
sale could avoid the legal consequences of that misconduct. Based on
these and other changes in the business and legal environment, and the
relatively low incidence of fraudulent bulk sales, the NCCUSL and A.L.I.
concluded that the burden placed on good faith transactions by Article 6
was no longer justified."' 2
Mindful of the political realities of the state legislative process, the NCCUSL and A.L.I. recognized that outright repeal of Article 6 might not be
a viable course in every state. Accordingly, as an alternative to repeal, the
NCCUSL and A.L.I. issued a substantial revision of Article 6 designed to
"reduce the burdens and risks imposed upon good-faith buyers of business assets while increasing the protection afforded to creditors."28 s The
principal changes made in revised Article 6 include the following: (1) applicability of Article 6 only where the purchaser has notice, or would have
had notice upon reasonable inquiry, that the seller will discontinue business operations after the sale; (2) exclusion of sales where the value of the
property otherwise available to creditors is less than $10,000 or greater
than $25,000,000; (3) inclusion of a choice of law provision specifying one
state's law as governing the entire transaction; (4) notification to creditors
by filing, rather than individual mailings, where the seller has a large
number of creditors; (5) increase in the notice period from ten days to
forty-five days; (6) required disclosure of how consideration for the bulk
sale is to be distributed; (7) exclusion of liability for buyers making good
faith efforts to comply with Article 6 or acting on the good faith belief
that Article 6 is inapplicable; and (8) substitution of a damages remedy
against the buyer for noncompliance in lieu of any claim against title to
the assets sold.2 '
The action taken by the first three states on the Article 6 recommendation occurred during 1989 and 1990. It confirmed the political instincts of
the NCCUSL and A.L.I.-all three states adopted revised Article 6.288
The tide took a definite turn in 1991, however, as ten of eleven states
3
addressing the issue voted to repeal Article 6.2
232. Id.
233. U.C.C. § 6-101 cmt. (1989).
234. Id.

235. California, Oklahoma and Utah (as reported in State Correlation Tables, U.CC.
REP. SERV. (Callaghan) xv (Dec. 1991)).
236. Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oregon, and Wyoming. Hawaii was the only state enacting revised Article 6 during 1991.
Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico, and West Virginia are expected to repeal Article 6 in 1992
(as reported by the American Law Institute).
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D. Status in Georgia

The Article 6 Subcommittee of the Georgia U.C.C. Committee23' has
not yet made a final recommendation on the course that should be taken
in Georgia. The preliminary view has clearly been that Article 6, in its
present form, should not remain in effect. Although the repeal-or-revise
debate is ongoing, the recent wave of states approving repeal of Article 6
should provide additional ammunition to the proponents of repeal in
Georgia. The Article 6 Subcommittee expects to make its decision on repeal or revision and to submit proposed legislation for approval by the
Board of Governors of the Georgia State Bar by late 1992. If approved,
Article 6 legislation could be introduced in the 1993 Georgia General
Assembly.
V.
A.

ARTICLE 8-INVESTMENT SECURITIES

Background

The "paperwork crunch" experienced in the securities industry during
the late 1960s resulted in the formation of the American Bar Association
Committee on Stock Certificates. This committee was charged with evaluating the possible elimination or reduction in the use of stock certificates
in paper form. In its 1975 report, the Committee recommended that (1)
the Model Business Corporation Act be amended to permit issuance of
stock in uncertificated form, and (2) Article 8 of the Code be revised to
regulate the rights, duties, and obligations of issuers of, and persons dealing in, uncertificated investment securities.238 The NCCUSL and A.L.I.
complied by drafting the 1977 Official Text of Article 8.23
B. Reasons for Revisions
In each of the fifty states, the trading of corporate securities, typically
stocks and bonds, is governed by the transfer rules found in Article 8 of
the U.C.C.2 4 0 The transfer system established by the original Article 8 is

based on the "certificate. 2 41 Transfer takes place when the certificate is
indorsed and delivered by one party to another.2 42 The original Article 8
237. Chaired by John B. Miller, Jr., of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Atlanta, Georgia.
238. See U.C.C. Art. 8 (1977) Reporters Introductory Comment, reprinted in 2C U.L.A.
267 (1991).
239. For discussion of major revisions to Article 8, see Shawn M. Storey, Comment, The
Practitioner'sGuide to Uncertificated Securities Under the Proposed Revisions to Article
8 in Georgia, 43 MERCER L. REv. 927 (1992).
240. U.C.C. §§ 8-301 to -320 (1962) (amended 1987).
241. Id. § 8-102.
242. Id. §§ 8-307 to -311.
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provided the rules for the indorsement and delivery of the certificate""3
and the "warranties of transfer" or guarantees of the transfer's validity, " '
but Article 9 provided the rules for the use of securities to secure debts.2"
While the certificated system still dominates securities transfers, electronic transfers are expanding. Revised Article 8 was drafted to establish
regulations for the newer system that is evolving: one that eliminates certificates and accomplishes transfers by entry on the issue books and appropriate notices to the parties involved.2 4
Revised Article 8 includes the same features as existing Article 8, with
the important exception of the certificate requirements. Revised Article 8
parallels the legal framework existing Article 8 established for
certificates
47
and gives priority in the law to neither system of transfer.
The practical advantages of an uncertificated system are clear: they allow issuers to take advantage of the efficiency and speed of computer
technology that can eliminate the sea of paper that afflicts the securities
market. The vast majority of states (forty-six) have already recognized
the need to adopt revised Article 8.28 These states include: New York,
the nation's trading capital; Delaware, the state of incorporation for large
businesses across the country; and most recently, Massachusetts.2 4
In states that do not adopt revised Article 8, traders will be less
equipped to do business with uncertificated companies. New firms desiring the benefits of certificateless transfer may choose to go elsewhere to
incorporate.
Another potential disadvantage for states that do not adopt revised Article 8 stems from the practice of pledging securities to obtain credit.
Lenders in any state need an adequate legal basis for transactions involving uncertificated transactions before entering into them. Without such
legal basis, lenders will withhold credit secured by perfectly valid collateral, and business will suffer.
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, which has been adopted
in. many states, including Georgia, authorizes corporations to issue shares
of stock without certificates.2 States that have adopted the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act but have not adopted revised Article 8
are in the position of empowering their corporations to issue uncertifi-

243.
244.

Id.
Id. § 8-306.

245. Id. § 9-304 (1972) (amended 1977).
246.

U.C.C. Art. 8 (1977) Reporters Introductory Comment, reprinted in 2C U.L.A. 267-

76 (1991).
247. Id.
248.

2C U.L.A. 278-79 (1991).

249. Id.
250.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-626 (1989).
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cated securities, but fail to provide a mechanism for their transfer or
pledge.
C.

Status in Georgia

Revised Article 8 was introduced in the Georgia General Assembly in
February 1991 as House Bill 761."' House Bill 761 contains several substantive variations from the official text, in addition to minor variations
that reflect mere changes in style that are necessary to maintain consistency with other articles of Georgia's Code. Georgia's version of section 8102 varies from the official text in that it contains a new subsection dealing with partnership interests in a limited partnership.2 52 This Georgia
variation makes clear that, except in the case of a "public" limited partnership, a partnership interest in a limited partnership
does not fall
53
within the definition of an uncertificated security.1
Georgia's new section 11-8-106 varies from the official text in that it
includes a final paragraph that excludes a number of Article 8's provisions applying to securities issued by a municipal corporation, county or
other political subdivision, authority or other similar public corporation,
governmental agency, or unit of the state.2 4 These securities are governed
by provisions of the "Revenue Bond Law.""25 This Georgia variation was
in existing section 11-8-106 adopted in Georgia and is carried forward
into the revised Article 8.25
Georgia's new section 11-8-316 varies from the official text by substituting the phrase "the purchaser of a security" for the phrase "his purchaser. 257 This variation makes it clear that a purchaser can demand
proof of authority 'not only from such purchaser's own immediate transferor, but also from any pledgee who retained a lien on the security involved, even if the purchaser had no direct dealings with such pledgee.
Georgia's new section 8-320 varies from the official text in that the
phrase "another clearing corporation" is added to subparagraph
(1)(a)(2)(ii).25 - This variation was added to the text to make clear that
this subparagraph covers securities that one clearing corporation may
control through its account with another clearing corporation. This clarification is important in light of the growing system of interfacing
depositories.
251. Revised Article 8, supra note 5 (to be codified at O.C.G.A. Title 11, Chap. 8).
252. Id. (to be codified at O.C.G.A. § 11-8-102).
253.

Id.

254. Id. (to be codified at O.C.G.A. § 11-8-106).
255.

O.C.G.A. §§ 36-82-60 to -80 (1987 & Supp. 1991).

256. Id. § 11-8-106 (1982).
257.
258.

Proposed Legislation, supra note 251, at Line No. 1296.
Id. at Line No. 1405.
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Revised Article 8, prior to being introduced in the General Assembly,
was reviewed by the Georgia U.C.C. Committee and was approved by the
Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia.
VI.

FINANCING STATEMENT FILINGS UNDER GEORGIA'S ARTICLE

9

A. Local Filing Issues
The 1972 Official Text of Article 9 provided three alternatives for
designating the appropriate locations for filing of financing statements.
The first alternative provides for local filing only in the case of timber,
minerals (including oil, gas, and related accounts), and fixtures; all other
filings are done in a central location, typically with the Secretary of
State.259 The second alternative expands the list of "local filing" collateral
to include consumer goods, farm equipment, farm products and related
accounts, general intangibles, and crops growing or to be grown-with all

other collateral to be covered by a central filing.2 0 The third alternative,
generally referred to as the "dual filing" alternative, is similar to the second alternative, but also requires a local filing where the debtor has only
one place of business in the state or, if the debtor has no place of business
in the state but resides in the state, also locally where the debtor
resides.""

Georgia, alone among the fifty states, has continued to maintain a completely local filing system for financing statements. 2" Apart from financing statements covering crops, minerals and related accounts, or fixtures,
all of which are to be filed in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate would be filed or recorded, financing statements are to be filed in
Georgia in the following locations:
(b) . . .when the debtor is a resident individual, then in the county
where he resides; or when the debtor is a partnership, a corporation,
other business entity not an individual, or a nonresident individual, then
in the county of the debtor's principal place of business in this state, but
if he has no place of business in this state then in the county where the
property is kept or used in this state. If the debtor has more than one
259.
260.
261.
262.

U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972).
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A § 11-9-401 (1982). Two states, Kentucky and Wyoming, provide for cen-

tral filing where the debtor is not a resident of the state, but otherwise require local filing.
Ky REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-401(1) (Baldwin 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 34.1-9-401(a) (1991). Louisiana has recently adopted a "central filing" system where the actual filing can be made at
any parish office. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-401(1)(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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place of business in this state, his principal place of business 2 shall be
deemed to be located at his chief executive office in this state."
In most cases, it is not difficult to determine the proper county for filing where the debtor is a resident individual or where the debtor has a
single place of business in Georgia. In other cases, however, the secured
party frequently faces uncertainty.
Which of the debtor's places of business will constitute its chief executive office in Georgia? The term "chief executive office" is not defined in
Article 9 or elsewhere in the Code. Official Comment 5(c) to section 9-103
indicates that the chief executive office is not the place of incorporation." 4 Instead, the term is intended to mean "the place from which in
fact the debtor manages the main part of its business operations." 2 5 According to the official comment, this is the place where persons dealing
with the debtor would normally look for credit information and is the
appropriate place for filing. 2" In order to ascertain the location of a
debtor's chief executive office, courts have focused on a variety of factors,
including (1) the existence of office autonomy, (2) the location of officers
and directors, (3) the office from which the annual report is generated, (4)
the location of financial records, (5) the office from which business is negotiated and contracts executed, (6) the location that generates greater
revenues, (7) the area in which a majority of the debtor's creditors are
located, and (8) the location from which primary accounting and legal
services are rendered." 7 Where the debtor clearly has a chief executive
office outside the state of Georgia, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to
determine that any place of business in Georgia constitutes its chief executive office in Georgia.
Where the debtor has no place of business in Georgia, the financing
statement must be filed in the county where the collateral is "kept or
used."26 8 This requirement places an investigative burden on the secured
party.
263.

O.C.G.A. § 11-9-401(1)(b) (1982).

264. U.C.C. § 9-103, cmt, 5(c) (1977).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., In re Metro Communications, Inc., 95 B.R. 921 (W.D. Pa. 1989). In a
recent Georgia case, the secured party's filing of a financing statement in the county where
the debtor's "principal office" and registered agent were located (as shown in the records of
the Secretary of State) was held to be ineffective where the evidence showed that some
business-related activities had already commenced in another county. The court concluded
that the principal place of business of the debtor existed in the second county even though
the debtor had not begun charging for its services in that county. Intertrust Corp. v. Fischer
Imaging Corp., 198 Ga. App. 812, 403 S.E.2d 94 (1991).
268. O.C.G.A. § 11-9-401(1)(b) '(1982).
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Attorneys representing secured parties filing financing statements in
Georgia have learned to cope with these various dilemmas by following a
simple rule: file in every county where it is remotely possible that a filing
might be deemed necessary. The risk of losing lien priority to a subsequent secured party or other lien creditor, as well as the risk of a total
loss of the security interest in a bankruptcy proceeding, dictates such a
conservative approach.
Georgia's local filing requirements present an even greater difficulty in
conducting lien searches. A filing originally made in the proper county
continues to be effective even though the debtor's residence, place of business, or the location of the collateral or its use (whichever controlled the
original filing location), is subsequently changed.2" Thus, the secured
party must conduct a thorough investigation of the debtor's history for at
least the past five years, determining the location of all residences, places
of businesses, chief executive offices, and locations of collateral. The risk
of missing one or more prior financing statements and the resulting loss
of lien priority dictate the same conservative approach when conducting
lien searches as for filing of financing statements. Prudent secured parties
will have lien searches performed in all counties where, under any set of
facts reasonably possible, a filing could properly have been made against
the debtor or a prior owner of the collateral.
B. Central Filing on Farm Products
Section 9-307(1) of the Code states that a buyer in the ordinary course
of business takes free of a security interest created by his seller, even
though the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.27 0 However, an exception to this general rule is made for purchasers of farm products from a person engaged in farming operations. 71 As a
result, purchasers of farm products who do not conduct the requisite inquiry regarding outstanding security interests may find themselves subject to claims from their seller's secured creditors if the seller fails to repay those creditors.
In the Food Security Act of' 1985,272 the United States Congress preempted the farm products exception and provided two alternatives by
269. Id. § 11-9-401(3).
270. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972); see also O.C.G.A. § 11-9-307(1) (1982).
271. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972). Dissatisfaction with the farm products exception led more
than 20 states to pass nonuniform amendments to Section 9-307(1). See State Correlation
Tables, U.CO. REP. SERv. (Callaghan). Georgia was not one of those states.
272. 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988). A detailed analysis of the Food Security Act of 1985 and the
subsequent responses by the states appear in Eldon H. Reiley, State Law Responses to the
Federal Food Security Act, 20 UCC L.J. 260 (1988). See also Steven W. Sanford, The Reborn Farm Products Exception Under the Food Security Act of 1985, 20 UCC L.J. 3 (1987).
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which the exception could, in effect, be restored. The first alternative requires the filing of an "effective financing statement" by the secured
party in a central filing system adopted by the state and certified by the
United States Department of Agriculture. 2 " The second alternative requires direct notification by the secured party to a potential purchaser of
is made aware of
farm products, so that prior to the sale the purchaser
2 74
products.
farm
the
in
interest
party's
secured
the
Among other requirements for certification, the state's central filing
system must provide for compilation of the "effective financing statements" into a master list organized by farm product and arranged within
the farm product category alphabetically by the debtor, numerically by
the debtor's social security number or taxpayer identification number, geographically by county, and by crop year. ' 7 The master list must also
contain the names and addresses of both the debtor and the secured
party, a description of the farm products subject to the security interest
including amount, if applicable, and a description of the property where
the farm products are located. 2 7 The Secretary of State must maintain a
list of buyers, commission merchants, and selling agents who register with
the Secretary and distribute to those so registered the portion(s) of the
master list that the registrant has expressed an interest in receiving.2 77 In
addition, the system must be able to provide to those not registered oral
within twenty-four
confirmation of any effective financing statement 278
hours of a request, followed by written confirmation.
A buyer, commission merchant, or selling agent takes subject to a security interest in farm products produced in a state where the buyer,
commission merchant, or selling agent has failed to register with the Secretary of State in order to receive such list and the secured creditor has
filed an effective financing statement covering the farm products. 7 9 A
buyer, commission merchant, or selling agent will also take subject to a
security interest in farm products produced in a state having a central
filing system when the buyer, commission merchant, or selling agent has
273. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e) (Supp. 1991).
274. Id. The "effective financing statement" contemplated by the Food Security Act
must contain more information than is currently required by Article 9 of the Code. Currently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has certified central filing systems in 17 states:
Alabama, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wyoming; certification for an eighteenth state, Colorado, is pending (as reported by the
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture in November 1991).
275. Id. § 1631(c)(2).
276. Id.

277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. § 1631(e).
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received written notice (either through the list or written confirmation of
interest and does not obtain a
an oral request) of the secured creditor's
20
waiver or release of that interest.
C. Status in Georgia
The additional costs created by multiple filings of financing statements
and multiple lien searches, all of which are typically passed along to the
debtor, together with the investigative burden and increased risks to secured parties of loss of lien priority or secured status, provide strong arguments for adoption of a central filing system for financing statements
in Georgia. In prior years, when consideration has been given to the adoption of a central filing system for Georgia, two major obstacles have been
identified: (1) the lack of computer capacity in the Office of Secretary of
State to handle a statewide central filing system; and (2) the lack of ready
access to information in the central filing system by parties conducting
records examinations on a local level.
Substantial progress has been made in overcoming these obstacles. The
Office of Secretary of State has expanded its computer capacity sufficiently to accommodate a central filing system. As part of the recent centralization of corporation and limited partnership filings in that office, arrangements have been made to have "on line" computer terminals in the
offices of each of the clerks of superior courts in Georgia, thereby providing local access to the Secretary of State's central filing system.
During 1990, the Article 9 Subcommittee of the Georgia U.C.C. Committee recommended that Georgia amend its Article 9 to provide for central filing of financing statements in a manner consistent with the "first
alternative" contained in the 1972 Official Text. The Article 9 Subcommittee further recommended that the central filing system include financing statements for farm products to permit the restoration of the farm
products exception in Section 9-307. Although recognizing that much
work would have to be done to design and implement a computerized
filing system that would adequately serve the needs of secured creditors
and other interested parties in Georgia, the Subcommittee concluded that
the benefits of such a system merited a serious and concerted effort to
begin the legislative and operational processes for central filing as soon as
possible.
At its meeting in January 1991, the Board of Governors of the Georgia
State Bar deferred action on the Article 9 Subcommittee's recommendations. As a result, no Bar-sponsored legislation to adopt a central filing
system was introduced in the 1991 Georgia General Assembly. However, a
bill providing for central filing was separately introduced late in the 1991
280. Id.
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session.2 8 The Article 9 Subcommittee believes that the bill should provide a suitable vehicle for the serious examination of the issues relating to
central filing. Indeed, a study committee on central filing, including representatives of the Georgia U.C.C. Committee, the Georgia Bankers Association, the clerks of the various superior courts, and the Secretary of
State's Office, has been formed and will be meeting during 1992 to develop further recommendations and possible legislation.
The challenges facing a shift to central filing are significant. Although
filing and search fees should be more than sufficient to offset the operational costs of a central filing system, the current strains on the State
budget may make it difficult to fund the "front end" design and implementation costs of a central filing system. The even greater challenge will
be to design a central filing system that will convince lenders, attorneys,
and other interested parties that adequate information can be retrieved
from the system accurately, conveniently, and promptly on a cost-efficient
basis.
VII.

OTHER PROSPECTIVE REVISIONS TO THE CODE

As one might expect, changes to the Code will not cease with the adoption of the new articles and revisions discussed above. The NCCUSL, as
"keeper" of the Code together with the A.L.I. and the PEB, has established drafting and/or study committees to further revise and update various articles of the Code.
A newly formed NCCUSL Article 2 Drafting Committee is considering
whether that article should be expanded to cover computer software,
sales of services (or at least mixed sales of goods and services), and licensing of intellectual property and other intangible rights. In addition, the
Committee is considering whether consumer sales should*be distinguished
from commercial sales.
The NCCUSL Article 5 Drafting Committee is considering whether to
draft new rules for the standby letter of credit (a practice not in existence
when current Article 5 was drafted); when a bank must honor a letter of
credit (existing law provides that the bank pays only if the letter of credit
conforms precisely to bank documents); and how Article 5 should relate
to and harmonize with the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, the UNCITRAL Rules, and the regulations of the Federal
Reserve Board.
The NCCUSL Article 8 Drafting Committee is considering what securities should be included under Article 8 (i.e., options and futures, treasury
securities, etc.); rules for security interests in securities (creation, perfec281. H.B. 1086, -

Leg., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced on March 13, 1991).
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tion, and priorities); and whether there should be a new approach to
rights and liabilities of those holding through financial intermediaries.
The PEB Article 9 Study Committee is considering, inter alia, the procedure for filing trade names, chattel paper buyers vs. secured party rules,
and the "knowledge" requirement.
As citizens, we can be thankful that the dedicated men and women of
the NCCUSL, A.L.I. and PEB are ever vigilant with respect to the Code
entrusted to them.

